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This research evaluates how effectively the award fee process has been in 
motivating contractor performance within the Southwest Division (SWD) of Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).  It analyzes the effectiveness of the current 
process in motivating contractors to performance excellence, identifies obstacles to 
effective motivation in the current process, identifies positive aspects of current 
procedures, as well as provides action recommendations, where warranted, for greater 
success in effectively motivating contractors to performance excellence through the 
award fee process.  
A survey revealed the current award fee process motivates contractors, but can be 
improved.  There are a number of problems and barriers; however, there are solutions.  
Periodic reviews of the award fee process are the single, objective solution discovered by 
the research.  A commitment to effective change by management is also important.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) 
(USD(A,T&L)) issued a Memorandum, on 27 February 1999, in which he expressed a 
concern that award fees earned by contractors are not always commensurate with their 
overall performance. He requested that agencies review their award fee contracts to 
determine whether award fee periods, evaluation factors, and award fees earned are 
commensurate with performance and are motivating performance excellence. If not, then 
consideration should be given to modifying the contract, changing factors, or changing 
evaluators. On 23 November 1999, the USD(A,T&L) issued a memorandum that 
forwarded a report by an Integrated Process Team (IPT) that outlined recommendations 
for structuring future incentives. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was recently amended to delete the 
statement  that award fee determinations are not subject to the disputes clause of the 
contract and inserted a statement that such determinations and the methodology for 
determining award fee are unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the 
Government. However, award fees are now subject to the disputes clause, and as a result, 
there may be a change in the way evaluations are conducted and factors are structured at 
Southwest Division. 
P.L. 106-79 limits to 35% of total cleanup obligations the amount of 
environmental restoration funding obligated under "indefinite delivery/indefinite 
quantity" contracts with a total value of $130 million or higher. Previously, there was no 
such restriction. This will change the nature of the way Southwest Division manages its 
Installation Restoration (IR) Program. Much of our work will now likely go to fixed-price 
contracts. These contracts tend to be more rigid. Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contracts will 
likely be saved for use on projects that are highly complex and with a high technical risk.  
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In view of the above, it has become even more critical that we motivate our award 
fee contractors to performance excellence to receive as much value as possible for the 
limited funding available. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research will eva luate how effectively the award fee process has been in 
motivating contractor performance within the Southwest Division (SWD) of Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). The objective is to clearly define the 
current award fee process and identify how and why it is structured in its current form. 
The research will analyze the effectiveness of the current process in motivating 
contractors to performance excellence, identify obstacles to effective motivation in the 
current process, identify positive aspects of current procedures, as well as provide action 
recommendations, if warranted, for greater success in effectively motivating contractors 
to performance excellence through the award fee process.  
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. The Primary Research Question: Is the current award fee process 
motivating performance excellence on the part of contractors for Southwest Division? 
2. The following are the subsidiary research questions:  
· What are award fee contracts, how do they work, and when should they be 
used? 
· What are some of the difficulties encountered in using award fee 
contracts? 
· What motivates contractors to perform? How should this information be 
used in structuring an award fee process? 
· How is the current award fee process at Southwest Division structured, 
and how did it come to be structured in this manner? 
· What metrics, if any, are being used to measure the effectiveness of the 
award fee process at Southwest Division? What metrics can and should be 
used?  
· What recommendations and lessons do current literatures reveal? 
· What are some of the critical barriers to motivating contractor 
performance, through the award fee process, and how might these barriers 
be overcome? 
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· What actions might Southwest Division take to enhance its current award 
fee process? 
D.  SCOPE OF THESIS 
The scope will include: (1) Definition and analysis of the award fee process and 
evaluation factors used on Environmental Cost Reimbursement Contracts at Southwest 
Division. (2) Analyze and evaluate whether or not the award fee process, as it  is currently 
structured, is motivating performance excellence on the part of Southwest Division 
contractors. (3) Determine which areas of the current process are successful and which 
areas are not successful. (4) Assess how the current process and evaluation factors could 
be improved.  
E.  ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis is written with the following assumptions: 
· The reader has a need for information on the award fee process—what 
works, what is problematic and suggestions for its improvement at 
Southwest Division. 
· That the reader is in a position to influence the award fee process or 
recommend suggestions for its improvement, in order to motivate 
contractor performance excellence. 
· That the reader holds a general knowledge and familiarity with 
Government contracting, and the award fee process. 
F.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research to answer the primary and 
subsidiary research questions are the following: 
· Conduct thorough Internet research and literature research of pertinent 
books, and other library information sources about cost reimbursement 
contracts and award fee incentive contracts.  
· Conduct survey interviews with Southwest Division Contracting, 
Engineering, Field, and Support Team personnel involved in the award fee 
process in order to assess their views on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the current process and to obtain their conclusions and suggestions for 
improving the current process. These surveys will be performed via e-
mail, with follow up phone calls, through several Southwest Division 
locations in San Diego in order to obtain the widest practical range of 
useful information. 
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· Examine current policies, procedures, regulations, and techniques for 
implementing the award fee process within the Southwest Division 
footprint. 
G.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter I is the introduction and provides the 
thesis background, research objective, primary and subsidiary research questions, scope, 
assumptions, methodology and how the thesis will be organized. This chapter establishes 
a framework for the reader. Chapter II provides a literature review in order that the reader 
becomes aware of contemporary research and of what others have done in implementing 
and analyzing the award fee process. Chapter III familiarizes the reader with how the 
award fee process is structured at Southwest Division, how it came to be structured in 
that manner, and compares its structure to those of some other organizations and against 
analysis research prepared by the Contractor Incentives Integrated Process Team. Chapter 
IV will describe the data and methodology. Issues such as defining award fee contracts, 
procedures and evaluation factors, and how the same are implemented at Southwest 
Division will be discussed in depth. The perception of the award fee process and how 
well it works based on the surveys of Southwest Division personnel will be presented. 
Chapter V will provide a data analysis, which will discuss barriers to motivating 
performance excellence, present alternative solutions and their associated cost, benefit 
and feasibility considerations. Chapter VI will provide the researcher’s recommendations, 
conclusions and answers to the primary and subsidiary research questions. The researcher 
will provide specific recommendations as to whether Southwest Division should continue 
the award fee process in its current form or if it should consider implementing process 
improvements, and areas for further research are then identified and discussed. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
It is increasingly critical that we motivate environmental Contractors to 
performance excellence, in the current environment of change.  Budgets continue to 
decline and customers seek services elsewhere.  As noted in Chapter I, recent legislation 
restricts the use of large cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts.  We can no longer afford 
to spend huge sums on CPAF contracts, while the work proceeds slowly.  It is imperative 
that we receive as much as we can from each dollar spent on our Comprehensive Long-
term Environmental Action Navy (CLEAN) and Remedial Action Contract (RAC) 
contracts.  In other words, we need to receive the biggest bang for the buck, both for our 
customers and the taxpayer.  To do this we must become flexible, and be able to act with 
agility to leverage our capabilities with respect to changing our award fee structure in 
order to incentivize contractors to performance excellence. 
Several organizations have recently studied their award fee process, identified 
some problem areas, and have made recommendations for improvement to their award 
fee contracts as a result.  These organizations note that a study of the process should 
begin with knowing which type of contract to use. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines cost-plus-award-fee contracts 
as a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (a) a base amount, 
which may be zero, fixed at inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, based 
upon a judgmental evaluation by the Government, sufficient to provide motivation for 
excellence in contract performance.  (FAR 16.305) 
FAR 16.405-2 states that CPAF contracts are suitable for use when it is neither 
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to 
cost, technical performance, or schedule; the likelihood of meeting objectives is enhanced 
by a contract that motivates exceptional performance and allows the Government 
flexibility in evaluating performance; and the additional administrative effort and cost is 
outweighed by the benefits to be derived.  
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The various types of contracts defined by the FAR can be described in terms of 
the associated cost risk to the contractor.  Figure 1 below shows these contracts 
graphically moving from the least risk to the contractor on the left and the most risk to 
the contractor on the right.  If the cost risk to the contractor is small, then it is greater to 
the Government.  The contracts types include cost-no-fee (CNF) and cost-plus-fixed-fee 
(CPFF) where the Government assumes all cost risk, cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF), cost-
plus-incentive-fee (CPIF), fixed-price- incentive-fee (FPI), fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF), 
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Figure 1. Contract Risk Continuum.  Source: NASA PBC Award Fee Contracting 
Guide, June 2001. 
Cibinic and Nash note that the major advantage of using CPAF contracts is 
improved communication between parties. This is due to the regular detailed evaluations, 
which point out deficiencies and weaknesses in addition to strengths.  Cibinic and Nash 
also note that contractors find CPAF contracts advantageous because they usually yield 
higher fees than cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. [Ref: 2] 
A major disadvantage of CPAF contracts is the substantial increase in 
administrative costs due to the continuous evaluation process and the increased 
paperwork involved.  At the same time, this increased paperwork leads to the increased 
communication.  Therefore, this type of contract should be used in situations where the 
size and importance of the work justify the increased use of resources. 
Under a CPAF contract, contractor performance is evaluated on a regular basis.  
The contractor may earn all or a portion of an available award fee pool, based on a 
subjective assessment by the Government.  The purpose is to motivate the contractor to 
attain, or exceed performance objectives. 
The FAR distinguishes award fee contracts from other incentive contracts because 
of the qualitative nature of the award fee criteria.  Because the contractor is evaluated on 
 7
a regular basis, there is much more of an administrative burden for the Government, 
however, if the contractor is being motiva ted properly, the benefits outweigh the 
additional duties. 
A CPAF contract provides a plan with stated criteria on which the contractor’s 
performance will be evaluated.  The plan provides for an award fee pool as a percentage 
of allowable estimated costs.  The contractor may earn anywhere from a minimum 
percentage, which may be 0%, to the maximum amount of the pool, which is set by the 
agency and is generally 10%. 
The plan also outlines how often the contractor’s performance will be evaluated.  
The evaluation, award fee determination, and award fee plan are unilateral decisions of 
the Government.  The Government may change the plan and the criteria, however, must 
notify the contractor. 
Contracts must be designed to support the award fee structure and process.  Lack 
of a well-defined structure will most likely cause conflicts that could undermine 
cooperation, weaken project commitment, and damage open communications.  Therefore, 
the award fee plan should emphasize both accomplishments and weaknesses.  
Additionally, a trained staff is necessary to insure that evaluations are properly performed 
and that the process is functioning as intended. 
B. RECENT STUDIES 
As noted earlier, a number of organizations have studied their award fee process.  
One of those is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  As a 
variation on incentive fee arrangements, NASA developed award fee contracts in the 
1960s.  The CPAF contract is now the most commonly used contract at NASA. [Ref: 16]. 
In the early 1990’s, a complete review of CPAF contracting at NASA was conducted. As 
a result of that study, changes were made in the requirements for use of, and in the 
structure of, CPAF contracts. The Agency’s regulatory award fee policy can be found in 
the NASA FAR Supplement at 1816.405-2.  
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In late 1999 and early 2000, an Agency-wide Assessment of NASA's 
Performance Based Contracting Implementation was conducted. Included in the 
Assessment Team's report were recommendations concerning award fee contracts.  The 
observations and recommendations of the team are summarized below. [Ref: 16] 
The observations include: 
· NASA is reluctant to make a connection between objective performance 
standards and objective performance.  Objective performance standards 
have been incorporated into a number of NASA Award Fee contracts, but 
the contractor's performance against those objective standards has been 
subjectively assessed in the award fee process. If the standards are not 
exactly right, NASA might be locked into them for the life of the contract. 
· Award Fee Plans allow for close control by NASA, through subjective 
evaluation criteria.  These criteria include responsiveness to NASA 
directions, contractor's workforce utilization, and contractor's resource 
management.  Subjective evaluations allow the “Level of Effort” mentality 
to continue and interfere with shifting performance risk to the contractor, 
since the contractor frequently waits for NASA direction in performing the 
contract.  
· “Letters of Emphasis” are widely used throughout NASA.  A letter is sent 
to the contractor prior to the start of the award fee period. However, the 
letters usually does not change the subjectiveness of the evaluation plan, 
but only update the current areas of interest or emphasis.  These letters 
could be used to promote Performance Based Contracting.  The letters 
would allow the projects to commit to an objective assessment for six 
months at a time on projects that are too risky to commit permanently.  
Numerous contracts were characterized as incentive fee or fixed fee, but in 
reality used subjective assessment in determining fee earned. In effect, 
these contracts should be characterized as award fee. The team concluded 
that the reason for these mischaracterizations was to avoid the burdensome 
and time-consuming aspects of administering award fee contracts.  
· Contractors noted that award fees were assessed with excessive 
subjectivity. They expressed concern that they were being evaluated on 
what occurred during the last week of an award fee period, rather than on 
the entire period. Some contractors stated that even though all 
performance standards had been satisfied, they received a disappointing 
grade in the award fee process. The contractor community almost 
unanimously agreed that there is a need for increasing the level of 
objectivity in the award fee process.  Some NASA centers made excellent 
use of "hybrid" contracts.  The contracts were structured to have work 
performed under various arrangements, such as award fee, performance 




The recommendations include: 
· The Office of Procurement should revise the NASA FAR Supplement to 
address considerations for determining if an award fee (subjective) or a 
performance fee (objective) is appropriate.  Consideration of risk 
assessment results and NASA's confidence level in the performance 
standards should also be included. 
· Issue Performance Based Contracting Award Fee guidance or policy 
emphasizing a preference for using outcome or output AF evaluation 
factors instead of management process factors. 
· Establish policy or guidance on the use of Letters of Emphasis. 
· Review the award fee process for streamlining, especially for lower dollar 
value contracts or for less complex fee structures.  
· Review the potential for issuing guidance for promoting the effective use 
of hybrid contracts and the need for awareness training. 
Another organization that performed a study of its cost reimbursement contracts is 
the Department of Energy (DOE).  DOE published the results as a Draft Staff Paper and 
posted it on the Internet in December 1995.  A Contract Reform Team completed the 
study.  The focus of the paper is on those elements relating to the management of 
environment, safety, and health (ES&H). The team noted the following weaknesses, 
remedies, and observations. [Ref: 6] 
· Cost-reimbursement contracts included various routine functions that 
could more effectively be obtained fixed price.  DOE was paying more for 
these routine, repetitive services or operations than necessary.  Contractors 
had little incentive to seek out least cost sources.  
· Broad and general statements of work that lacked any performance criteria 
or measures that would allow the DOE to evaluate the contractor's 
performance effectively and determine how much to award in fees. The 
fee determination process actually consisted of two processes. First, the 
costs incurred in the general management and operations of a facility were 
identified by the contractor, reviewed by the DOE, and, with few 
exceptions, were reimbursed.  This was often called the base fee 
determination, and typically covered 80 to 90% of the contract costs. 
Second, the contractor's performance in a series of "performance 
evaluation areas" was evaluated (such as general management, facility 
operations, ES&H, etc.), a determination of possible award fee was 
developed by a Performance Evaluation Review Board, and then a final 
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award fee determination was made by a Contracting Officer. The team 
noted that the primary faults with this process were (1) The large base 
fees, and (2) the use of weighted, post-performance evaluation criteria that 
were often vague and subjective. Even if a contractor was rated poor in 
one area (such as ES&H) it could easily be outweighed by good 
performance in one or more other areas, or by the subjective evaluation 
process. There was limited accountability for performance and few 
objective measures to evaluate and reward contractors according to their 
performance. This situation was often aggravated by the vague, general 
contract scope of work.  In the contract SOW, ES&H objectives were 
often vague and unclear regarding DOE expectations.  
At the time of the Draft Paper, DOE developed the Necessary and Sufficient 
process to define the specific standards that apply to the ES&H operation of a facility.  
These can be boiled down into a document called a Standards/Requirements 
Identification Document (S/RID), which would be incorporated into the contract, thus 
clearly spelling out for the contractor the expected criteria, and performance can be 
judged based on performance of these expectations.  Further efforts are aimed at 
developing clearly stated, results oriented performance criteria and measures.    
The Reform Team also noted inappropriate cost-reimbursement policies and weak 
incentives for performance.  DOE reimbursed the contractor for practically all costs 
incurred.  Costs were disallowed only if the contractor demonstrated "...willful 
misconduct or lack of good faith."  
The Reform Team stated that levels of contract funding were unrelated to 
contractor performance; instead the funding of the contract was related to the size of total 
operations and available budgets.  Incentives were not structured to encourage superior 
performance and cost-effectiveness, or to encourage the contractor to assume more of the 
financial risk.  
The Contract Reform Team recommended:  
· Technical performance, delivery/schedule, and cost baselines in which the 
contractor would receive a graduated incentive based on performance 
which met, failed to meet, or exceeded these baselines;  
· Future work and budget be established for a contractor based on a 
consideration of past performance (thus more closely tying the ES&H 
budget planning and program management);  
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· An element of the award fee process, which would consider the 
performance of a contractor, compared to similar contractors performing 
similar work;  
· A Laboratory Directed Research & Development (LDRD) allocation as a 
means to reward laboratory performance;  
· Performance based compensation for senior profit and nonprofit contractor 
personnel;  
· Cost reduction/cost avoidance sharing incentives in which the contractor 
to share in any real savings realized;  
· Provisions for a multiple fee structure -- fixed fee, award fee, etc. -- within 
the same contract.  [Ref: 6] 
Additionally, the Contract Reform Team recommended a change in DOE policy 
that would allow only one five year extension in any contract, based on performance.   It 
also recommended a revised award fee structure to allow contract costs to be linked to the 
performance criteria and measures. These changes, together with the revisions which 
allow sharing of cost savings/cost avoidances, which would encourage the contractor to 
accept a larger proportion of the financial risk.  
As noted in Chapter I, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics) was concerned that contractors do not have incentives that focus on the 
outcomes the Government desires.  As a result, he appointed an Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) to address the issue.  The Contractor Incentives IPT prepared a report with 
recommendations.  Their recommendations are summarized below. [Ref: 14] 
· Contract incentives should be flexible and structured on a case-by-case 
basis. 
· Award fee contracts should provide short evaluation periods with a limited 
number of evaluation criteria. 
· Effective motivators were found to include allowances for special rewards 
for achievement of superior performance. 
· An incentive fee arrangement with multiple incentives may be used when 
contract performance is measurable in objective terms. Regardless of 
contract type, earned fee should be commensurate to performance, and 
consistently applied among the varying arrangements. 
· The correlation of award fee payments and performance evaluations 
would be enhanced by using an award fee evaluation that roughly 
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corresponds to achievements addressed in the performance evaluation, and 
by using consistent definitions for evaluation terms. 
· Obtain support from the Comptroller early where the award fee plan 
contemplates retention of dollars in an award fee pool for long periods of 
time. 
As can be seen from the IPT’S first recommendation above, incentives should be 
flexible and structured on a case-by-case basis.  This report will define where the 
Southwest Division award fee procedures fit in the spectrum of cost-plus-award-fee 
contracts.  
Southwest Division Environmental CPAF contracts are written with broad 
performance based Statements of Work (SOW), as are NASA and DOE contracts.  The 
uncertain nature of environmental studies and cleanups requires such.  The award fee 
plans are structured to measure cost, technical, and schedule parameters.  As noted above, 
other agencies have had difficulties in linking broad performance based SOWs to precise 
evaluation criteria, with objectivity in mind.  The Southwest Division contracts appear to 
have a similar problem; however, due to the uniqueness of the work, there is no “one size 
fits all” solution that will apply. 
Improved award fee evaluation factors and procedures alone may not fully 
improve the effectiveness of Southwest Division’s environmental CPAF contracts. The 
entire acquisition process plays a role in the success of these procedures. Additionally, 
effective contract and program management are essential.  This analysis is but one 
element aimed at diagnosing the award fee process and in improving performance on the 
part of contractors.  
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III. COST PLUS AWARD FEE AT SOUTHWEST DIVISION  
A. AWARD FEE CONTRACTS 
1. Process 
To fully grasp the consequences of structuring an award fee process, it is first 
necessary to give an overview of what an award fee process should entail.  This 
information is derived from a variety of sources. 
FAR 16.405-2 Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts, summarizes CPAF contracts as 
follows: 
(a) Description. A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-
reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of 
(1) A base amount fixed at inception of the contract and 
(2) An award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in 
part during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for 
excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and 
cost-effective management. The amount of the award fee to be paid is 
determined by the Government's judgmental evaluation of the contractor's 
performance in terms of the criteria stated in the contract. This 
determination and the methodology for determining the award fee are 
unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government. 
(b) Application. 
(1) The cost-plus-award-fee contract is suitable for use when -- 
(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor 
effective to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to 
cost, technical performance, or schedule; 
(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be 
enhanced by using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor 
toward exceptional performance and provides the Government with the 
flexibility to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under 
which it was achieved; and 
(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost required to 
monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits. 
(2) The number of evaluation criteria and the requirements they 
represent will differ widely among contracts. The criteria and rating plan 
should motivate the contractor to improve performance in the areas rated, 
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but not at the expense of at least minimum acceptable performance in all 
other areas. 
(3) Cost-plus-award-fee contracts shall provide for evaluation at 
stated intervals during performance, so that the contractor will periodically 
be informed of the quality of its performance and the areas in which 
improvement is expected. Partial payment of fee shall generally 
correspond to the evaluation periods. This makes effective the incentive 
which the award fee can create by inducing the contractor to improve poor 
performance or to continue good performance. 
(c) Limitations. No cost-plus-award-fee contract shall be awarded 
unless -- 
(1) All of the limitations in 16.301-3 are complied with; and 
(2) The contract amount, performance period, and expected 
benefits are sufficient to warrant the additional administrative effort and 
cost involved. [Ref: 10] 
Cibinic and Nash note the elements of a CPAF contract are Estimated Cost, Base 
Fee, Maximum Fee, and Award Fee periods. [Ref: 2].  The award fee evaluation of each 
CPAF contract is subjective, however the process is methodical.  The award fee plan 
spells out the areas to be evaluated, the type of rating system, and how the ratings are 
translated into award fees. 
Determining the award fee amount begins with the preparation of an evaluation 
by personnel overseeing, or who are familiar with, the contractor’s performance.  These 
personnel should be the most knowledgeable of the strengths and weaknesses evidenced 
by the contractor’s performance for the period and the project.  The evaluation is then 
submitted to a board of personnel of a higher level. 
The Board reviews each of the evaluations, determines if each is a fair view of the 
contractor’s performance, and makes a recommendation on the overall ratings of the 
contractor for each evaluation.  The Board may also consider any self-evaluations that the 
contractor may wish to submit. 
The Fee Determining Official (FDO), who is at an even higher leve l than the 
Board, then determines the fee amount.  Once the determination is made, the amounts 
and ratings are disclosed to the contractor.  The contractor may ask for a debrief on any 
or all of the evaluations. 
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2. Evaluation Factors  
The project team that prepares the evaluation to be submitted to the Board must 
consider the factors determined for the contract.  The project team provides adjectival 
ratings for each of the evaluation areas with sufficient narrative for review by the Board 
and the FDO. 
Commonly used evaluation factors include technical, management, and cost 
control.  Technical factors include the ability to satisfactorily meet the requirements of 
the project, it’s milestones, and delivery dates. 
Management factors include control of the project, compliance with contract 
provisions, and control of subcontractors.  Again, ability to adhere to schedule may be 
included. 
Cost control factors include accuracy of budget forecasts, cost savings, and 
control of overhead.  Control of subcontractor costs, and performance of lease versus buy 
analysis, and competition effectiveness may be considered. 
Some contracts show what the award fee criteria will be in the contract award.  
Others issue the criteria to the contractor after award and may change the criteria from 
time to time, with notice to the contractor. 
Once the Board has reviewed the evaluation and made a numerical 
recommendation to the FDO, the adjectival rating must be translated into an award fee 
amount.  The rating system used is up to the discretion of the agency.  For example, the 
Project Team may evaluate a contractor’s performance as Superior, which translates to a 
point rating range of 96-100.  The Board then says makes a recommendation of 96%, 
which may translate to 100% of the award fee available for the period.  Another agency 
might translate the 96% rating to only 90% of the award fee available in an attempt to 
motivate the most from the contractor.  
B. SOUTHWEST DIVISION AWARD FEE 
1. Process 
Guidance for current award fee procedures at Southwest Division comes from 
various sources.  The most relevant guidance comes from two Naval Facilities 
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Engineering Command guidebooks.  The first of these guidebooks is the Comprehensive 
Long-term Environmental Action Navy (CLEAN) Contract Manual.  The second is the 
Remedial Action Contract (RAC) Manual. 
The CLEAN and RAC Manuals were developed as handbooks that formalize the 
concepts, policies, and procedures to be used by personnel involved with preparing, 
administering, and managing the two major types of environmental cost reimbursement 
contracts used by NAVFAC. 
The Navy participates in the Department of Defense (DOD) Environmental 
Restoration Program (DERP).  This program covers the investigations and cleanups of 
military sites. 
NAVFAC serves as the technical expert for the Navy.  For NAVFAC, CLEAN 
contracts provide investigations, studies, and identification of cleanup alternatives.  RAC 
contracts provide the actual cleanup of sites. 
These investigations and cleanups contain many unknowns and cannot be fixed 
priced. Cost-plus-award-fee contracts have been the preferred contractual vehicle, 
because there are so many unforeseen conditions. The award fee process described in the 
CLEAN and RAC Manuals are similar, with important differences due to the nature of 
the work.  That is studying and producing reports versus, remediating or cleaning up a 
site. 
The award fee, as noted above, is payable at four to six month intervals, which is 
established and outlined as the Award Fee Plan in the contract at the time of award.  This 
assumes a calendar basis rather than a milestone basis, as noted in Cibinic and Nash. 
[Ref: 2]  The purpose of the award fee is to incentivize contractors to performance 
excellence. 
Each project, as awarded by a Contract Task Order (CTO), has an award fee pool 
based on the negotiated amount.  This pool may be a maximum of 10% of the negotiated 
cost, excluding travel.  The contractor may earn a minimum up to a maximum.  The 
minimum is 0% of this pool, while the maximum is the total available award fee pool. 
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The Navy Project Team for the CTO prepares a quarterly performance evaluation 
of the contractor’s work for the previous three months.  This serves as notice to the 
contractor of how well it is performing. 
The Navy team prepares an award fee evaluation bi-annually that covers the 
previous six months.  It consists of written comments on three elements. The evaluation 
notes the percentage of work completed.  This forms the basis for the amount of the CTO 
award fee pool available for the instant period. 
On the CLEAN contracts, Element A is for Technical Services and Products.  
Element B is for Task and Program Management Support.  Element C is for Cost 
Control. 
Under the RAC contracts, Element A is Technical Services and Quality 
Management.  Element B is Effective Cost and Schedule Management.  Element C is 
Professional Project Management Relationships and Customer Satisfaction. 
Each of these broad categories is subdivided into several subcategories that serve 
as the evaluation criteria.  The Navy team comments on areas of accomplishment and 
superior performance, and on areas needing improvement. 
Each of the subcategories, categories and the overall CTO performance for the 
period is given a numerical and adjectival rating.  The ratings available consist of four 
numerical levels that are levels 1 through 4.  Level 1 is the highest, with level 4 being the 
lowest.  Within each level, there are three adjectival sublevels; they are high, medium, 
and low. 
As an example, major category Technical Services and Products may be rated a 
Level 1 High, yet the overall CTO evaluation may be rated as Level 2 High, depending 
on how all the other categories and subcategories are rated.  The award fee evaluation is 
submitted to the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR), after it is reviewed and 
agreed upon by all members of the Project team.  The members include the Remedial 
Project Manager (RPM) or Project Leader, the Contract Specialist (CS), the Navy 
Technical Representative (NTR), the Remedial Technical Manager (RTM), and the 
Business Line Team Leader (BLTL). 
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The COR consolidates all the CTO evaluations and submits them to an Award 
Fee Evaluation Board. The COR and the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), 
along with any input provided by project teams, evaluates the contractor on its Program 
Management Office (PMO) performance for the period for each CTO.  20% of the 
available award fee for a period for each CTO is set aside for the PMO evaluation.  This 
evaluation is also submitted to the board. 
The Award Fee Evaluation Board considers all the evaluations and their ratings, 
any self-evaluation provided by the contractor, and obtains any further information 
necessary to make a recommended rating and award fee amount to the Fee Determining 
Official (FDO).  A recommendation is made for each CTO based on the Project team 
rating, its corresponding PMO rating, and an overall combined rating based on these two. 
The contractor can earn 90% to 100% of the available award fee pool for a period 
for achieving a level one rating.  Level two ranges from 61% to 89%.  Level three ranges 
from 30% to 60%.  Level four is 0%. 
The Fee Determining Officials for NAVFAC are the Commanders of each 
Engineering Field Division (EFD) or Activity (EFA).  The FDO makes the final award 
fee determination, and a letter is issued informing the contractor. 
The ACO and/or the Project team will discuss the results with the contractor and 
note areas needing improvement and make recommendations on how improvement can 
be achieved.  The contractor may request debrief for a particular CTO or CTO’S if the 
ACO or Project team have not covered them already. 
The CS prepares a modification to deduct the unearned fee for the period, since 
the fee is not transferable to another period and is permanently lost. 





Award Fee Evaluation Process  
Performance Monitors Prepare Evaluations 
Performance Evaluation Board Reviews Evaluations; recommends score 
Fee Determining Official Determines final award fee to contractor 
 
Figure 2. Award Fee Evaluation Process.  Source: Researcher. 
 
2. Evaluation Factors  
The evaluation factors, as noted above, are derived from the three major 
categories.  They differ slightly between the CLEAN and RAC contracts. 
Listed below are the Elements and their subcategories for CLEAN contracts at 
Southwest Division. The Navy Project team notes any significant accomplishments and 
any areas needing improvement for each of the elements and their evaluation factors on 
both a quarterly basis for progress review and bi-annually for award fee evaluation 
purposes. 
Element A. Technical Services 
A.1 Technical competence and innovation 
A.2 Clarity, thoroughness, and technical quality of deliverables and 
documentation 
A.3 Responsiveness to Government comments on deliverables 
A.4 Responsiveness to Government comments on fieldwork 
Level 1: Thorough technical analysis and solutions.  Deliverables with 
minor corrections.  Achieves continuous improvement.  Promotes and 
maintains teambuilding. 
Level 2: Reasonable quality and effective management.  Deliverables with 
some correctable weaknesses in products and services.  Strives to make 
continuous improvements.  Effective relations. 
Level 3: Quality only acceptable with Government input.  No continuous  
improvement efforts visible.  Some deficiencies in products and services, 
which require Government input to correct.  Adequate relations. 
Level 4: Technical analysis does not support solutions proposed.  




Element B. Task and Program Management Support 
B.1 Effective planning, scheduling, and reporting 
B.2 Suitability of staffing and resources for work to be performed 
B.3 Effective coordination of subcontractors and consultants 
B.4 Responsiveness 
Level 1: Thorough management analysis and solutions.  Effective 
schedule control.  Highly effective management of the subcontracted 
effort.  Achieves continuous improvement.  Promotes and maintains 
teambuilding. 
Level 2: Reasonable technical quality and effective management.  
Schedule controls (some slippage).  Strives to make continuous 
improvement.  Effective relations. 
Level 3: Changes in delivery schedule, which do not cause significant 
problems.  Adequate management of the subcont racted effort with some 
inefficiencies.  No continuous improvement efforts visible.  Adequate 
relations. 
Level 4: Failure to meet delivery schedule without notice or plan for 
correction.  Failure to monitor subcontractors.  Deficiencies so pervasive 
as to require substantial rework.  Ineffective relations. 
Element C. Cost Control 
C.1 Effective management of budget, accounting, and reporting system 
C.2 Minimize costs including subcontractor and consultant costs 
C.3 Accuracy and timeliness of current and projected cost reporting 
Level 1: Control of costs yields some savings.  Achieves continuous 
improvement. 
Level 2: Effective cost control.  Strives to make continuous improvement. 
Level 3: Reasonable cost control with some increase in cost.  No 
continuous improvement efforts visible. 
Level 4: Significant cost increases due to inadequate performance.  
Deficiencies so pervasive as to require extensive rework. [Ref: 15] 
Listed below are the Elements and their subcategories for CLEAN contracts at 
Southwest Division. The Navy Project team notes any significant accomplishments and 
any areas needing improvement for each of the elements and their evaluation factors on 
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both a quarterly basis for progress review and bi-annually for award fee evaluation 
purposes. 
 
A. Technical Services/Quality Management 
Compliance with scope of work and federal and state regulations and 
guidelines 
Implemented technically innovative solutions to perform work sooner, 
more effectively, at a lower cost and with focus on closure of site 
Implemented effective quality control and health and safety program 
Pro-active in assisting Government to determine technical requirements 
(rules, regulations, and guidelines) to respond to changed field conditions 
Provided timely, accurate, and complete deliverables 
B. Effective Cost and Schedule Management 
Implemented cost savings initiatives resulting in cost reductions and/or 
cost avoidance. 
Utilized resources efficiently, including labor, equipment, and 
subcontractors. 
Timeliness of performance of work. 
Submitted timely, accurate, and complete monthly reports, cost proposals, 
invoices, and 75% budget notifications. 
Minimized cost and schedule impact from changes in field conditions and 
requirements. 
C. Professional Project Management Relationships and Customer 
Satisfaction 
Maintained professional team relationships and provided sufficient 
communication. 
Provided sufficient project planning to maximize efficiency and minimize 
impact of field/construction work on activity personnel and operations. 
Provided proactive approach and responded to problems and issues. 
Provided fast, effective reaction to problems.  Maintenance of a neat/clean 
project site and lay-down area. 
Responded timely to Government CTO physical closeout requirements. 
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Each of the contracts affords the contractor an opportunity to earn a percentage of 
the available award fee pool.  The major categories of available award fee pool are 
described below and are taken from a Southwest Division CLEAN contract. [Ref: 22] 
Level 1 – 90-100% of available award fee: 
Technical performance which corrects the hazardous waste problem, 
which may have innovative elements. 
Timely completion with minor corrections, or completion after increases 
due to additional requirements or regulatory changes. 
Highly effective management of the subcontracted effort. 
Control of costs yields some savings. 
Results recognized from continuous improvement. 
May include minor correctable weakness in products and services. 
Level 2 – 61-89% of available award fee: 
Reasonable technical quality and effective management. 
Timely deliverables and schedule control with some corrections and 
slippage.  Successful management of the subcontracted effort. 
Effective cost control. 
Strives to make continuous improvements. 
May include some correctable weakness in products and services. 
Level 3 – 30-60% of available award fee: 
Quality only acceptable with Government input. 
Changes in delivery schedule, which causes significant problems. 
Adequate management of the subcontracted effort with some 
inefficiencies. 
Reasonable cost control with some increase in cost. 
No continuous improvement efforts visible. 
Deficiencies in products and services which require Government input to 
correct. 
Level 4 – 0% of available award fee: 
Technical performance does not follow the design or record of decision 
and does not correct the hazardous waste problem. 
Failure to meet delivery schedule without notice of plan for correction. 
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Failure to monitor subcontractors. 
Significant cost increases due to inadequate performance. 
Deficiencies so pervasive as to require substantial rework. 
Ineffective relations with Navy or regulators. [Ref: 23] 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The FAR notes that CPAF contracts provide for a fee that consists of a base fee 
and a maximum fee.  The FAR also notes that the number of evaluation criteria and their 
requirements will vary amongst contracts, as will award fee periods.  However, the FAR 
remains silent on what those criteria may be, and on how an award fee plan might be 
structured.  A number of agencies have structured award fee plans, and Cibinic and Nash 
summarize a basic structure as noted above. [Ref: 2]  Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is to describe how Southwest Division has structured its CLEAN and RAC 
contract award fee plans.  
At Southwest Division, the adjectival ratings of the project team are translated 
into a numerical rating by the Board for recommendation to the FDO.  For example, if the 
project team rates the contractor performance as Level 1 High, the Board may note a 
numerical rating of 96%.  Southwest Division uses a one for one factor in translating the 
numerical score to an award fee amount.  In this case, the contractor would be awarded 
96% of the available award fee pool for the period. 
The evaluation areas and factors noted above for Southwest Division CLEAN and 
RAC contracts can be generally characterized as “input” factors.  That is, the efforts that 
the contractor puts forth in the various areas have effects that determine the quality of the 
“outputs.”  The outputs then being the performance of the contractor, that is the quality of 
the products delivered by the contractor.  These outputs may include providing quality 
deliverables, meeting significant milestones in a timely manner, and completing the 
project on time and on budget.  In the current climate of performance based contracting, 
should the evaluations be focused on the outputs rather than the inputs, or some 
combination of both? 
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In general, the more exactly that work can be defined, the more possible and 
perhaps more desirable it is to use “output” factors.  Contracts for routine services appear 
to be more suited to using performance factors.  R&D contracts, which have less 
determinable end results, appear better suited to input factors. 
Therefore, it is critical that proper evaluation factors be chosen for the 
performance evaluation plan.  The selection depends on the contract at hand, but the 
goals of the criteria should be to get the best results from the contractor.  The criteria 
should have as the overarching goal the end products or outputs of the project.  However, 
input criteria may be the best way to get a contractor to give the best output.  Also, while 
it may not be an output product, safety is of primary importance on any project, and 
should be evaluated.  There are other inputs, such as safety, that an agency may not wish 
to disregard as evaluation factors.  
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IV. DESCRIBE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA COLLECTION RESEARCH METHODS 
Data for this study of the Southwest Division Award Fee process was obtained 
primarily using two methods.  The first method involved gathering data from the latest 
award fee evaluations for one CLEAN contract and for one RAC contract.  The purpose 
was to compare the project team evaluations to the final award fee ratings.  Chapter I 
noted that contractors might be receiving high award fees, but not performing to an 
excellent standard.   
The second method involved gathering data through a survey sent to a sampling 
of individuals involved in the award fee evaluation at various levels of the process.  The 
survey was sent to fifteen individuals, ten of who responded.  Additionally, several 
follow-up phone calls were made to gather information to clarify some of the responses 
given by some individuals.     
The data collected using these two methods provided important information about 
the actual award fee process and the way the way the process is perceived by those who 
participate in the process throughout Southwest Division.  The perception of the process 
is important because the way it is perceived is the “reality” for the individual.  This 
information was helpful in determining actual problems with the process and perceived 
problems.   
Survey respondents were guaranteed anonymity in order to facilitate their 
responses and the quality of their responses.  Therefore, none of the names of respondents 
are used in this paper.  Additionally, codes, team names, or other organizational specific 
identifying notations are not used.  Therefore, the paper alludes only to the content of the 
individual’s responses. 
Ten individuals responded to the survey.  The following criteria were used to 
choose this representative sample of individuals: level in the organization regarding the 
award fee process, length of experience with the award fee process, and variety of 
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experience with CLEAN and RAC award fee processes.  Also, it should be noted that 
individual availability due to workloads affected the number of respondents. 
The respondents to the survey represent various engineering, administrative, 
contracts, and management disciplines.  All respondents work on various teams at 
Southwest Division in San Diego.  The ten respondents represent a cross section of 
personnel based on the selection criteria.  Specifically, all respondents had at least several 
years experience working with both the CLEAN and RAC award fee processes, and 
covered various levels of award fee evaluation preparation and evaluation 
review/recommendation.  In essence, the respondents had characteristics similar to that in 
general for Southwest Division personnel involved at various organizational levels, 
experience levels, and at the various stages of the award fee processes. 
The survey consisted of fifteen questions.  Fourteen questions were designed to 
elicit respondent perceptions of how well the award fee processes work, or if the 
processes are not working, what it is about the processes that do not work.  Question 
fifteen was an open-ended question that allowed the respondents to make any comments 
about the award fee processes that may not have been covered by the other questions.  
The questions were designed to elicit responses beyond either yes or no.  The surveys 
were sent via email.  In all, ten completed surveys were received, and several follow up 
phone calls were necessary to clarify several responses.   
To understand the respondents’ interaction with the award fee process and 
consequently their responses, familiarity with the project team configuration and the 
award fee board configuration is necessary.  The project team that performs the 
evaluation consists of at least three individuals.  First, there is the Remedial Project 
Manager (RPM) or Project Leader responsible for the Project.  This individual acts in an 
engineering capacity.  Second, there is the Contract Specialist assigned to the team.  
Third, there is the Remedial Technical Manager (RTM), who acts in the capacity as an 
expert in a particular area relevant to the project.  This individual may have very frequent 
or only occasional involvement in the project.  Fourth, there may be a Navy Technical 
Representative (NTR) who assists the team by acting as the leader in fieldwork.  
Depending on the nature and complexity of the project, a NTR may be necessary.  
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Individuals are generally simultaneous members of various project teams.  Therefore, 
team members have limited availability for project oversight, and are highly dependent 
on the award fee evaluation to notify contractors of problems, and to document 
significant accomplishments and strengths and weaknesses.  This team is the closest to 
the contractor team in terms of day-to-day involvement and oversight of the various 
projects. 
After an evaluation is completed and signed by the team members for an award 
fee evaluation period, it is reviewed and signed by the Business Line Team Leader 
(BLTL) responsible for the project.  The completed evaluation is forwarded to the COR’s 
office for coordination with the award fee board to review and make recommendations to 
the Fee Determining Official (FDO). 
The award fee board consists of several members.  These members are chosen for 
their level in the organization and for their experience.  Some are former project leaders 
who have been promoted to various team lead or management positions.  Additionally, 
for each contract a senior contract specialist is the Administrative Contracting Officer 
(ACO).  The team also has a Contracting Officer one level above the ACO; and the 
Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) as members.  This board reviews the 
evaluations from the project teams and makes recommendations for numerical award fee 
scores.  Finally, there is the FDO, who meets with the Board to finalize the award fee 
amounts.  The FDO for Southwest Division is the Commander. 
B. DATA OBTAINED 
As noted above, the first data gathering method was to collect the award fee 
evaluations from the project teams and compare them against the final award fee 
evaluation determinations for a CLEAN and a RAC contract.  The purpose was to 
compare the teams’ evaluations with the Board recommendations and FDO ratings, to 
determine if there is consistency in how the ratings are applied.  Table 1 below 
summarizes the information gathered in this manner for the last award fee period for a 
CLEAN contract. 
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CTO#    Team Rating    Board        Board            
                                       Tech          Mgmt                                                        
                                       Rating       Rating                                                   










































Level 2 M 79% 
Level 1 L 91% 
Level 2 M 75% 
Level 1 L 92% 
Level 1 M 95% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 2 H 85% 
Level 2 M 80% 
Level 2 M 82% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 M 94% 
Level 2 M 72% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 2 M 80% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 H 100% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 2 H 85% 
Level 2 H 87% 
Level 1 L 92% 
Level 1 M 93% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 M 95% 
Level 2 M 75% 
Level 1 M 93% 
Level 2 H 88% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 M 95% 
Level 2 H 89% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 1 H 98% 
Level 2 M 78% 
Level 1 L 90% 
Level 3 M 51% 
Level 1 M 95% 














































































Table 1. CLEAN Award Fee.  
Source: SWDiv CLEAN Evaluation. 
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Table 2 below summarizes the last award fee evaluation period for a RAC 
contract. 
CTO#    Team Rating    Board        Board            
                                       Tech          Mgmt                                                  
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Table 2. RAC Award Fee.  Source: SWDiv RAC Evaluation. 
 
The second method of gathering data involved a survey emailed to respondents.  
Appendix A is a list of the questions sent to the respondents.  As previously noted, the 
respondents were guaranteed anonymity; therefore, responses are not attributed to 
individuals. 
The first question on the survey asked if the current process motivates contractors 
to performance excellence.  Responses varied from absolutely not to yes, but the process 
needs improvement. 
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Question number two asked if the final award determinations reflect the 
contractor performance.  There was no clear consensus and the response varied from no 
to yes, to it varies. 
Question number three asked if the appropriate evaluation factors were being 
utilized to evaluate contractor performance.  The responses were roughly split and were 
either no or yes, but should be tailored to each project. 
Question number four asked if all relevant factors are utilized.  Most concluded 
that factors need to be project specific and should be updated on a periodic basis. 
Question number five asked what factors might be missing from the current 
process.  Some responded that there were no factors missing.  Other respondents noted 
that the contractors are evaluated on criteria that are different from the criteria that the 
customer uses to evaluate the project and that the award fee process should make room 
for the customer’s criteria.  Still others noted that the process does not allow for project 
specific criteria.  Two stated that the contractor should be evaluated on 
customer/regulator/public satisfaction. 
Question number six asked if the appropriate evaluation period length is utilized.  
Eight agreed that a six-month evaluation period was appropriate; however, two stated that 
the periods could be varied based on the complexity of the project or the amount of work 
completed.  If the project was making significant progress, a shorter period could be 
used.  If the project was not making significant progress, a longer period could be used. 
Question number seven asked if the Government effectively communicated its 
objectives to the contractors.  Most agreed that the objectives are made clear; however, 
the objectives change over time and vary from Project Leader to Project Leader, which 
leads to confusion on the part of the contractors.  Two responded that the Government did 
not make project objectives clear. 
The eighth question asked if the objectives conflict with the incentives.  Most 
respondents agreed that the objectives and the incentives do not conflict; however, two 
respondents stated that the objectives and incentives do conflict.  One noted that there is a 
major conflict in the area of cost.  By saving costs, the contractor receives a higher fee; 
 31 
however, the savings become available for additional work by the contractor without an 
opportunity to earn additional award fee on the increased work. 
Question nine asked if we verify that contractors are being incentivized.  All 
respondents agreed that there is no procedure in place to verify that the factors utilized 
are actually those that motivate the contractors. 
Question ten asked if the structure of the current award fee process made 
contractors dependent on Government oversight and direction.  The answers differed in 
that two respondents felt that it depended on the contractor, on how long they had worked 
with the contractor.  Three stated that highly qualified contractor teams required less 
oversight, but those in which they had less confidence were given more oversight.  Two 
others stated that oversight by the Government was necessary due to the nature of the 
work in order to get a quality product.  The remaining three stated that the process did not 
make contractors more dependent. 
The eleventh question asked if the process could include both short-term and 
long-term incentives.  All agreed that it could include both short-term incentives for the 
specific project, and long-term incentives for the entire contract; however, no one 
responded with suggestions for the incentives. 
Question twelve asked what difficulties were encountered using the award fee 
process.  Six respondents noted that because of the organizational structure and differing 
goals, there was a communications gap between project teams and the Board.  One 
individual noted that contractors might become complacent due to the subjectivity of the 
process, while expecting high award fees.  One noted that they pay for both good and bad 
products.  Another noted that the second rating level is too broad and should be split to 
add another category.  One noted that due to the subjectivity of the process and the 
involvement of profit, contractors are reluctant to admit mistakes or take responsibility 
for mistakes. 
Question number thirteen asked what changes, if any, would respondents make to 
the current process.  The answers to this question were varied.  Several respondents noted 
that the evaluation by the project team should be firm and not changed by the Board, and 
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that the system should support the project team more.  One noted that contractors should 
be encouraged to come forward with errors without fear of reprisal during the award fee 
evaluation.  Another respondent noted that award fee penalties should be deeper for poor 
performance. One noted that more evaluation factors could be added.  Finally, one 
respondent noted that the project team should be invited to sit with the Board during the 
review process.  Three did not respond with any changes that they would make. 
The fourteenth question asked respondents what barriers they see to implementing 
change to the award fee process.  Some noted that changes to the basic contract would be 
required.  Others noted that the organization might lack support for extensive changes.  
Some noted that politics might play a part, and that contractors would protest changes 
that are not in their favor.  Finally, some noted that the opinions on what needs to be 
changed are so divergent that a consensus might not be reached. 
The final question asked respondents for other comments or recommendations.  
Some noted that there is great variation in objectives depending on the Project Leader, 
which leads to confusion not only for the contractor, but for the Navy too.  Others noted 
that there is room for improvement, and that management should be made aware.  The 
remaining respondents had no further comments or recommendations. 
The next chapter discusses and analyzes in more detail the data presented here.   

















V. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
A. SUCCESSFUL PROCEDURES AT SOUTHWEST DIVISION 
This chapter analyzes the data presented in previous chapters.  The researcher also 
presents observations as to whether or not the data gathered and presented is sufficient to 
answer the primary research question and the subsidiary questions, and where the data is 
ambiguous, contrasts and comparisons with other studies are made. 
The researcher holds that while identifying and defining successful procedures is 
not easy, definite distinctions do emerge.  To establish which procedures are successful, 
the researcher gathered data from the FAR, previous studies, current award fee 
evaluations, and through a survey. 
FAR 16.405-2 states the award fee evaluation factors in very broad and general 
terms and includes technical quality, cost, and schedule.  What the FAR does not describe 
or prescribe is the way in which agencies structure their award fee evaluation plans.  
Therefore, agencies have wide discretion, as long as they include the factors noted in the 
FAR.  Southwest Division cost-plus-award-fee contracts include these factors in their 
award fee plans. 
Cibinic and Nash note that there is great flexibility in selecting award fee criteria.  
The type and number of criteria, under the broad factors, are left to the agency to decide, 
based on their own specific needs.  [Ref: 2]  Southwest Division CPAF contracts have 
been tailored to meet the broad objectives of its environmental projects.  The criteria, as 
noted in Chapter III, contain both inputs, and outputs together.  For example, on CLEAN 
contracts, the contractor is rated on technical competence and innovation; and on clarity, 
thoroughness, and technical quality of deliverables and documentation.  This supports the 
position that the overarching goals of the Southwest Division award fee structure are both 
program and project results oriented; and that the criteria were chosen accordingly.  In 
Chapter II, the criteria that suggest this results orientation were laid out. 
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The Contractor Incentives IPT, noted in Chapter II, recommended that award fee 
contracts should provide short evaluation periods, with a limited number of evaluation 
criteria. 
Southwest Division evaluates its contractors twice during an award fee period.  
The first is a quarterly evaluation at the end of the first three months and the second is 
given at the end of the first six months.  The purpose is to give regular feedback to the 
contractor on its strengths and weaknesses on a project.  The second evaluation is the 
evaluation submitted to the Award Fee Board for review and recommendation to the 
FDO.   
Question number six of the survey asked if the appropriate evaluation period 
length is utilized.  Eight agreed that a six-month evaluation period was appropriate; 
however, two stated that the periods could be varied based on the complexity of the 
project or the amount of work completed.  If the project was making significant progress, 
a shorter period could be used.  If the project was not making significant progress, a 
longer period could be used.  The researcher surmises that the survey data show that this 
is a long enough period to formally notify contractors of performance, but not so long as 
to inappropriately withhold payment of award fee earned. 
The survey data outlined in Tables 1 and 2 of Chapter IV suggest that the ratings 
given by the project team are given commensurate numerical ratings by the Board and 
FDO, and are consistently applied.  This is in direct contrast to several of the responses to 
question number thirteen of the survey.  Several respondents noted that the evaluation by 
the project team should be firm and not changed by the Board, and that the system should 
support the project team more.  This suggests that there are times when the Board or FDO 
change the rating by the project team; however, this is wholly within the discretion of the 
Board or FDO.  Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there were no changes to project team ratings 
for these two rating periods. 
Tables 1 and 2 also suggest that the correlation of award fee payments 
corresponds with the performance evaluations.  Because the ratings are consistently 
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applied, they translate into award fee payments commensurate with the contractor’s 
performance as evaluated by the project team. 
Chapter IV noted that a survey of Southwest Division personnel involved in the 
award fee process was conducted.  The survey consisted of fifteen questions.  Fourteen 
questions were designed to elicit respondent perceptions of how well the award fee 
processes worked or if the processes were not working, and what it is about the processes 
that do not work.  Question fifteen was an open-ended question that allowed the 
respondent to make any comments about the award fee processes that may not have been 
covered by the other questions. 
Question number two asked if the final award determinations reflect contractor 
performance.  There was no clear consensus and the responses varied from no to yes, to it 
varies.  The data outlined in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there is a direct correlation 
between the project team rating, the Board recommendation, the FDO determination, and 
therefore the award fee paid the contractors.  The team responsible for the project 
prepares the evaluations; therefore, it is reasonable to assume they should reflect the most 
accurate assessment of the contractor’s performance.  
Survey question number seven asked if the Government effectively 
communicated its objectives to the contractors.  Eight respondents agreed that the 
objectives are made clear, however, since objectives change over the length of the 
project, and vary from Project Leader to Project Leader; there may be some confusion on 
the part of the contractors.  Southwest Division cost contracts give great flexibility to the 
project team to adjust criteria as necessary and give greater or lesser weight over time as 
projects progress.  At any given time, the project team may change the importance 
between cost, schedule, or quality.  The research shows that the objectives are clearly 
communicated; however, there may be times where there is communication breakdown.  
This is a normal part of project administration. 
The eighth question asked if the objectives conflict with the incentives.  Eight of 
the ten respondents agreed that the objectives and the incentives do not conflict.  This 
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shows that contractors try to satisfy the Government’s needs in hopes of being rewarded 
with the award fee incentive. 
Question ten asked if the structure of the current award fee process made 
contractors dependent on Government oversight and direction.  The answers differed in 
that two respondents felt that it depended on the contractor, depending on how long they 
worked with the contractor.  Three stated that highly qualified contractor teams required 
less oversight, but those in which they have less confidence are given more oversight.  
Two others stated that oversight by the Government was necessary due to the nature of 
the work in order to get a quality product.  The remaining three stated that the process did 
not make contractors more dependent.  The research suggests that due to the complexity 
of environmental projects, much oversight of contractors by the Government is 
necessary. 
The current climate in the Government contract administration arena is less 
oversight of contractors, which is what the contractors also prefer.  The researcher 
concludes that contractors should be clearly notified that performance excellence results 
in less Government oversight in future evaluation periods.  By doing so, both parties 
achieve their goal – less administrative oversight.  
B. PROCEDURES NEEDING IMPROVEMENT 
The Contractor Incentives IPT Report noted in Chapter II, recommended that 
contract incentives should be flexible and structured on a case-by-case basis.  Effective 
motivators were found to include allowances for special rewards for achievement of 
superior performance.  Southwest Division incentives are structured on the award fee 
arrangement.  This suggests that contractors are motivated by the profit incentive 
While contractors are motivated by profit, other incentives also motivate 
contractors.  These include extra-contractual considerations such as: expanding company 
operations, increased future business, enhanced company image and reputation, benefits 
to non-defense business, keeping skilled personnel, and a narrow base for fixed costs.  
[Ref: 8] 
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The IPT Report also noted an incentive fee arrangement with multiple incentives 
may be used when contract performance is measurable in objective terms.  Some aspects 
of Southwest Division projects have performance elements that are measurable in 
objective terms.  An example is meeting key milestones and the overall schedule for a 
project.  These areas could be rated separately and be given appropriate weight depending 
on the project. 
The first question on the survey asked if the current process motivates contractors 
to performance excellence.  Responses varied from absolutely not to yes, but the process 
needs improvement.  The answers are varied, so no definitive conclusion can be drawn as 
to whether or not the contractors are motivated to excellence.  What can be concluded is 
that while the process works, it needs some improvement. 
Question number three asked if the appropriate evaluation factors were being 
utilized to evaluate contractor performance.  Question number four asked if all relevant 
factors are utilized.  The responses to these two questions were that the appropriate 
factors are used; however, they need to be project specific and should be updated on a 
periodic basis.  This suggests that the generic award fee plan must be tailored for each 
project.  For example, those factors not important to the project can be ignored, thus 
giving greater weight to the remaining criteria. 
Question number five of the survey asked what factors might be missing from the 
current process.  Some responded that the contractors are evaluated on criteria that are 
different from the criteria that the customer uses to evaluate the project; therefore, the 
award fee process should make room for the customer’s criteria.  Two stated that the 
contractor should be evaluated on customer/regulator/public satisfaction, because the 
Southwest Division team is “evaluated” on these factors.  This suggests that they should 
include criteria that are important to the customer, regulators, and public, because their 
satisfaction also determines the success or failure of a project.  The researcher notes, 
through experience in this area, that cost and schedule performance are often hampered 
by lengthy regulatory review of documents.  This is often due to lack of regulator 
involvement up front in the project planning stage, and lack of knowledge of regulatory 
criteria.  This suggests a need to clearly define those criteria that will satisfy regulators, 
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customers, and the public, and integrate them into the specific project, and hold the 
contractor responsible for those criteria over which he clearly has control. 
Question eight of the survey asked if objectives and incentives conflicted.  Most 
agreed that they did not; however, one respondent noted that there is a major conflict in 
the area of cost.  By saving costs, the contractor receives a higher fee; however, he is then 
given more work in order to spend the savings.  The problem is that the award fee pool is 
not increased to give the contractor an opportunity to earn additional award fee on the 
increased work.  This means that the contractor does not have a true incentive to save 
costs.  The contractor receives more work, but not more profit.  Therefore, the incentive 
is really to expend all the funds on a project.  Expending all the funds on the project, and 
having none left over to return, satisfies the program objectives.  However, the project 
team wants to receive as much work as possible for the funds allotted, but program goals 
may win out over project goals. 
Therefore, the researcher concludes that in order to satisfy both the program goals 
and the project goals, an incentive is needed.  For example, a portion of the savings 
achieved, could be subtracted from the cost portion and added to the award fee pool, as 
long as it does not go above the contract maximum allowable fee.  The contract could be 
structured to allow for this share in savings.  The majority of the risk would be on the 
contractor, and the savings would need to be proved, not just projected.  In addition, the 
savings would need to be substantial to make it worth the efforts required to modify the 
task order. 
Question nine asked if we verify that contractors are being incentivized.  All 
respondents agreed that at this time there is no procedure in place to verify that the 
factors being utilized actually are those that motivate the contractors.  A system to track 
and verify if incentives are effective should be developed and implemented. Since 
contractors are currently evaluated based on cost, schedule, and technical quality, 
methods of verification should be based on the same.  
In the area of cost, the contractor could be measured on the actual cost of work 
performed compared to the cost of the work performed on previous similar projects.  For 
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example, Southwest Division could develop a database where historical cost data are 
stored.  When a project is contemplated, the actual costs of previous similar work could 
be accessed.  The contractor costs could be compared against this data and the negotiated 
cost.  Additionally, contractors should be tracked to note the number and amount of cost 
overruns, and increases such as cost growth. 
Contractors are also evaluated based on schedule, however, most projects have 
numerous modifications, and contractors are rarely penalized for schedule slippages.  
Milestone data, like the historical cost data, could be collected in a database, and the 
contractor could be measured against how well he compared against this data, and the 
agreed upon project schedule. 
Technical quality may be more difficult to verify that a contractor is being 
incentivized.  Southwest Division keeps an Administrative Record that includes all 
documents prepared under its contracts.  Quality of similar documents for similar projects 
could be compared.  For remediation work, verification that the contractor is being 
incentivized will rely on the experience of the project team, including the customer and 
regulators. 
The consequences of a verification process could be substantial for the 
Government.  It could result in an increase in cost savings, technical quality, reduced 
schedule, and greater customer satisfaction. 
The eleventh question asked if the process could include both short-term and 
long-term incentives.  All agreed that it could include both short-term incentives for the 
specific project, and long-term incentives for the entire contract; however, no one 
responded with suggestions for the incentives.  As noted above, contractors are motivated 
by extra-contractual incentives in addition to profit.  Some of these could be included in 
Southwest Division contracts.  This could include the possibility of future work, by using 
phases to award portions of a project at a time.  In order to receive the next phase of 
work, the contractor must perform well on the previous phase.  Another way would be to 
award additional time on the contract to the contractor for overall superior performance.  
This is called award term contracting.  Rather than award fee, the contractor may earn 
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additional time. [Ref: 8]  Publicizing successful projects in the environmental community 
could enhance company image and reputation, as could special recognition awards. 
Question twelve asked what difficulties were encountered using the award fee 
process.  Six respondents noted that because of the organizational structure and differing 
goals, there is a communications gap between project teams and the Board.  One 
individual noted that contractors might become complacent due to the subjectivity of the 
process, while expecting high award fees.  One noted that we pay for both good and bad 
products.  Another noted that the second rating level is too broad and should be split to 
add another category.  One noted that due to the subjectivity of the process and the fact 
that profit is involved; contractors are reluctant to admit mistakes or take responsibility 
for mistakes. 
This data suggests an internal barrier to efficiency exists.  The researcher 
concludes that while the organizational structure may remain the same, the project team, 
evaluation board, and the FDO do not communicate unless necessary.  They should 
communicate more.  As noted earlier, the project team should be invited to sit with the 
evaluation board and the FDO during the recommendation and determination process.  
Additionally, program goals can be updated and communicated through periodic training 
for project teams.  The enhanced communication will narrow the current gap, thereby 
fostering a closer working relationship, and lessening internal friction. 
Because the evaluation process is subjective, contractors will always perceive 
unfairness on the part of the Government, and they will try to hide mistakes.  There is not 
very much that can be done in this area.  A diligent project evaluation team must strive to 
detect these mistakes, and decide how much priority to give between projects.  Due to the 
nature of cost contracts, as long as the contractor is putting forth his best effort, and the 
costs are allowable, allocable, and reasonable, the Government pays, even if the product 
is bad and needs to be reworked. 
Question number thirteen asked what changes, if any, would respondents make to 
the current process.  The answers to this question were varied.  Several respondents noted 
that the evaluation by the project team should be firm and not changed by the Board, and 
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that the system should support the project team more.  One noted that contractors should 
be encouraged to come forward with errors without fear of reprisal during the award fee 
evaluation.  Another respondent noted that award fee penalties should be deeper for poor 
performance. One noted that more evaluation factors could be added.  Finally, one 
respondent noted that the project team should be invited to sit with the Board during the 
review process.  Three did not respond with any changes that they would make.  
The researcher concludes that there are both internal and external communication 
issues.  The project team may want deeper penalties for poor performance, but may at 
times have their evaluation changed by the Board and the FDO.  This suggests that the 
contractor will first hide errors, but if discovered, may appeal to the Board or FDO with 
explanations for why the errors occurred.  The Board may then request further 
information from the project team, or it may not, and change the evaluation or leave it 
alone.  The contractor comes to view the Board as a “higher” authority than the project 
team, if the evaluation is upgraded.  This could be devastating to the project team trying 
to complete a project in the field.  The contractor may then fail to communicate with the 
project team, and go to the Board as a preemptive strike.  The Board, however, is not the 
best authority when it comes to evaluating the day-to-day performance of the contractor.  
Additionally, the Board has no contact with the customer whom the project team is trying 
to satisfy, and may undermine customer satisfaction and project leader authority.   
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify for the contractor the roles and responsibilities, and 
the divisions of authority between the Project Team, the Board, and the FDO.  
The fourteenth question asked respondents what barriers they see to implementing 
change to the award fee process.  Some noted that changes to the basic contract would be 
required.  Others noted that the organization might lack support for extensive changes.  
Some noted that politics might play a part, and that contractors would protest changes 
that are not in their favor.  Finally, some noted that the opinions on what needs to be 
changed is so divergent that a consensus might not be reached. 
The researcher concludes that there are numerous individuals responsible for the 
award fee process, which is not conducive to gaining support for change, or gaining a 
consensus as to what the change should entail.  Changes to the basic contract are not 
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necessarily difficult in and of themselves, but support for extensive change is particularly 
difficult when the potential benefits for improvement are not readily evident, or are not 
perceived to outweigh the costs of the change. 
The final question asked respondents for other comments or recommendations.  
Some noted that there is great variation in objectives depending on the Project Leader, 
which leads to confusion not only for the contractor, but for the Navy too.  Others noted 
that there is room for improvement, and that management should be made aware.  The 
remaining respondents had no further comments or recommendations. 
This suggests to the researcher that the variation is due to the subjectivity of the 
process and of the individuals.  This makes this type of contract difficult, but not 
unmanageable.  Increased communication by the Government to the contractor can help 
alleviate some of the confusion, and as a result lead to increased efficiency.   The 
comment that management should be aware suggests that concerns have been voiced, 
however they have not been addressed satisfactorily.  As noted before, increased internal 
communication can reduce friction, and foster an enhanced working relationship. 
The next chapter discusses conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for 
improvement of the award fee process at Southwest Division.  In addition, the primary 
and subsidiary research questions are answered. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ANSWERS TO 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
There is a concern that award fees earned by contractors are not always 
commensurate with their overall performance.  Therefore, a review of award fee contracts 
is necessary to determine whether award fee periods, evaluation factors, and award fees 
earned are commensurate with performance and are motivating performance excellence. 
The FAR was recently amended to delete the statement that award fee 
determinations are not subject to the disputes clause.  P.L. 106-79 limits to 35% of total 
cleanup obligations the amount of environmental restoration funding obligated under 
"indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity" contracts with a total value of $130 million or 
higher.  Therefore, it has become even more critical that we motivate our award fee 
contractors to performance excellence to receive as much value as possible for the limited 
funding available. 
FAR 16.405-2 states the award fee evaluation factors in very broad and general 
terms and includes technical quality, cost, and schedule, but does not prescribe the way in 
which agencies should structure their award fee evaluation plans.  Therefore, agencies 
have wide discretion. 
Southwest Division CPAF contracts have been tailored to meet the broad 
objectives of its environmental projects.  The award fee plans contain both inputs and 
outputs together.  Southwest Division contracts are both program and project results 
oriented, and the criteria were chosen accordingly. 
A comparison of evaluations and final ratings was prepared, and award fee 
payments correspond with the performance evaluations.  Because the ratings are 
consistently applied, they translate into award fee payments commensurate with the 
contractor’s performance as noted by the project team. 
A survey was conducted that revealed a number of results.  Southwest Division 
award fee periods are six months in length and are appropriate for its contracts.  The 
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current award fee process motivates contractors, but can be improved.  Over time 
complacency has set in, and business as usual without rocking the boat is normal.   
The award fee process at Southwest Division, like all CPAF plans, is subjective 
and therefore, the perception of performance excellence differs between players.  
Consistency between teams in evaluating performance can be improved.  In addition, 
contractors have come to know how the system works, and use that knowledge to their 
advantage.  There are a number of problems and barriers; however, there are solutions. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
There is no consensus as to what extent contractors are being motivated.   
Given the current budget constraints, and the concern that contractors receive award fees 
higher than they have earned, the researcher attempted to determine if award fees are 
consistent with evaluations.  The award fees are consistent with the evaluations earned.  
However, survey respondents also noted that the award fee process needs improvement 
due to complacency. 
Evaluation factors include both program goals and project goals.  The 
evaluation criteria generally include the appropriate factors, but are not periodically 
updated.  Objectives change over time; therefore, evaluation criteria change. 
Contractors do not always have incentives to cut costs.  Because all allowable, 
reasonable, and allocable costs are covered under the cost contract, contractors do not 
always look to save costs.  Contractors expect a high fee and the extra efforts to save 
costs may not result in significantly higher evaluations to justify the effort. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Combat complacency in the award fee process.  The process has become more 
like a routine chore.  The evaluations require: much thought and input from the teams; 
much review and oversight by the Board and FDO; and encompasses many different 
projects within a program.  The process should be streamlined to minimize the factors 
and criteria.  Some criteria may be for routine services and can be objectively evaluated, 
requiring no narrative comments.  Once evaluated, the team evaluation should not be 
shared with the contractor and then changed.  Contractors should be held accountable for 
outcomes as much as possible. 
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Allow for other incentives in the contracts.  Contractors are motivated by other 
factors, in addition to profit.  Include allowances for special rewards for achievement of 
superior performance.  The contracts could include incentives such as additional time on 
the contract, rather than awarding fee alone.  Winning additional time satisfies the need 
for future work, enhances the contractor’s reputation, and allows the contractor to retain 
skilled human capital, thereby enhancing consistency of personnel working on a program. 
Focus more on outcomes.  The current award fee structures focus heavily on 
inputs and management processes.  However, they should allow room to note 
accomplishments or weaknesses on deliverables (the outcomes).  The current climate is 
to focus more on Performance Based Contracting and to allow contractors to define for 
themselves how best to accomplish the project requirements.  Although this is best suited 
for routine services, there are many services performed as part of cost reimbursement 
contracts that can be evaluated objectively. 
Inject more objectivity into the current process.  Review the contracts to 
determine if routine services are being performed and can be objectively evaluated.  
Review the award fee process for streamlining, especially for low dollar value contracts 
and for less complex projects.  After identifying routine services, employ the use of a 
check-off list without narrative comments, as appropriate. 
Periodically review the award fee process.  The process should be reviewed on 
a regular basis to determine if the process still meets the needs of the users.  Additionally, 
the review can reveal if factors and criteria are appropriate as objectives change. 
Ensure that contractors are being incentivized.  The current award fee process 
does not validate whether contractors are being motivated.  The reliance is on the project 
team to know if the contractor is motivated, based on the evaluation.  The evaluation 
process has become somewhat complacent; therefore, this is not necessarily a foolproof 
method.  Two things to do are to perform market research and ask the contractors what 
motivates them. 
Perform training of personnel.  Some personnel may not be fully aware of the 
program goals or the project goals.  In addition, program goals and project goals change 
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over time; therefore, the evaluation criteria should change or they become irrelevant.  
Because the current process is wieldy and difficult to manage, regular training sessions 
will help streamline the process and help focus users on a more consistent way to 
evaluate contractors. 
Allow project team to set objectives for each period.  The project team should 
be allowed and encouraged to set specific objectives as evaluation criteria for award fee 
periods as necessary.  For example, if a project has moved into a phase where there is 
monitoring of wells on a quarterly basis, the objective criteria would be that the 
contractor successfully performed the monitoring.  Little or no accompanying narrative 
would be required.  The contractor may still be evaluated on inputs, but they are held 
accountable for accomplishing the milestones.  These are both objective and measurable. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section discusses the primary and subsidiary research questions posed in 
Chapter I.  All the questions are answered as fully as possible. 
The Primary Research Question: Is the current award fee process motivating 
performance excellence on the part of contractors for Southwest Division? 
The current award fee process motivates contractors, but is imperfect and can be 
improved.  When a program is first put in place, the award fee process is applied with 
vigor and usually yields good results.  As programs mature, the vigor with which they 
were initiated tends to wane.  As a result, some complacency may develop on the part of 
both the Government and the contractor.  Some teams come to depend on relationships 
developed rather than on the award fee process, and performance outcomes may be 
uneven and may even mask unseen pathologies. 
The award fee process is subjective and the perception of performance excellence 
differs between Program Managers, and between Project Teams.  As noted above, the 
relationships between the teams and contractors may become a factor in the evaluation 
process.  Therefore, at times, the quality or quantity of the contractor’s work may not be 
the only factor influencing the evaluation. 
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In addition, contractors understand that there is a review process above the Project 
Team.  Contractors may submit self-evaluations  for the award fee period after receiving 
the Project Team evaluation, but the evaluation is submitted to the Board, and not the 
Project Team.  Many Project Team members conclude that the contractor is being given 
an opportunity to rebut the evaluation. 
The following are the subsidiary research questions:  
What are cost-plus-award-fee contracts, how do they work, and when should 
they be used? 
Cost-plus-award-fee contracts are a type of cost-reimbursement contract where 
the contractor can earn a fee, consisting of a minimum and a maximum, based on a 
judgmental evaluation by the Government.  The fee should be sufficient to provide 
motivation for contractor performance excellence.  CPAF contracts are suitable when 
they enhance the likelihood of meeting contract objectives, motivate exceptional 
performance by the contractor, and allow the Government flexibility in evaluating 
performance.  Additional administrative effort and cost is outweighed by the benefits 
derived from the use of the CPAF contract. 
What are some of the difficulties encountered in using award fee contracts? 
Difficulties include complacency because it is easier to give an evaluation that is 
average, rather than one that is below average.  A bad evaluation means more work for 
the team.  The project teams are working on many projects simultaneously, and to give a 
bad evaluation means the team has to justify the bad evaluation.  If the Board and the 
contractor challenge it, the project teams will have to rebut and fortify their position, and 
may still have their evaluation overridden by the Board and/or FDO.  Therefore, 
contractors see the Board and the FDO in charge of the project, rather than the team.  
This creates internal friction, as the project teams perceive that their concerns are set 
aside for program concerns.  Contractors are aware of all of this and expect high 
evaluations, whether their work has earned it or not.  Therefore, the Government pays for 
both good and bad performance. 
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Contractors are reluctant to take responsibility for their mistakes and attempt to 
hide them because profit is at stake, and they will refute bad evaluations.  It is difficult to 
make poor evaluations stick and the project suffers because communication is stifled and 
trust is eroded.  
What motivates contractors to perform?  How should this information be 
used in structuring an award fee process? 
Contractors are motivated by the profit incentive.  However, other factors also 
motivate contractors.  These include extra contractual considerations such as expanding 
company operations, increased future business, enhanced company image and reputation, 
benefits to non-defense business, keeping skilled personnel, and a narrow base for fixed 
costs. 
The Government could use this information to structure contracts to add 
incentives such as additional time on the contract for superior performance rather than 
awarding fee alone.  Winning additional time could also satisfy some of the other 
incentives such as enhanced reputation, and keeping skilled personnel working. 
How is the current award fee process at Southwest Division structured, and 
how did it come to be structured in this manner? 
Guidance for current award fee procedures at Southwest Division comes from two 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command guidebooks.  The CLEAN Contract Manual, and 
the RAC Manual. 
CLEAN contracts provide investigations, studies, and identification of cleanup 
alternatives.  RAC contracts provide the actual cleanup of sites.  These investigations and 
cleanups contain many unknowns and cannot be fixed priced.  Cost-plus-award-fee 
contracts have been the preferred contractual vehicle because there are so many 
unforeseen conditions. 
Each CTO has an award fee pool based on the negotiated amount.  The minimum 
is 0%, while the maximum may be up to 10% of the negotiated cost, excluding travel.  
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The Project Team prepares a performance evaluation quarterly, and an award fee 
evaluation bi-annually that covers 6 months.  The contractor is rated on Technical, 
Management, and Cost. 
Each of the categories, subcategories and the overall CTO performance for the 
period is given a numerical and adjectival rating.  The award fee evaluation is submitted 
to an Award Fee Evaluation Board for review and recommendation to the FDO.  The 
FDO makes the final award fee determination and a letter is issued informing the 
contractor. 
What metrics, if any, are being used to measure the effectiveness of the 
award fee process at Southwest Division?  What metrics can and should be used? 
Currently, there are no real metrics in place to measure the effectiveness of the 
award fee process itself.  Research for this project revealed that a number of survey 
respondents feel the process has problems and needs improvement. 
A survey of personnel involved in the process, on a periodic basis, should be 
conducted.  We evaluate the contractors on a periodic basis, and we should evaluate the 
process on a periodic basis.  The goal of the survey would be to measure if the current 
process continues to meet the needs of the users. 
What recommendations and lessons  do current literatures reveal? 
Recent studies reveal that there is concern, by contractors and Government, due to 
the subjective nature of the award fee process.  This reveals a need for increased 
objectivity in the process. 
Cost-reimbursement contracts include various routine functions that could more 
effectively be obtained fixed price.  The Government pays more for routine, repetitive 
services or operations than is necessary.  Contractors have little or no incentive to seek 
ways to minimize costs. 
Recommendations include reviewing contracts to determine if an award fee is 
even appropriate, reviewing the process for streamlining, especially for low dollar value 
contracts and for less complex projects, and issuing award fee guidance emphasizing a 
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preference for using objective outcome or output evaluation factors instead of 
management process factors. 
What are some of the critical barriers to motivating contractor performance, 
through the award fee process, and how might these barriers be overcome? 
The first barrier is complacency on the part of the contractor and the Government.  
The second is that due to the subjectivity of the process and because profit is at stake, 
contractors tend to satisfy the team rather than the objectives of the project.  These two  
barriers can be overcome by injecting more objectivity into the process, by holding 
contractors to the objectives, and by encouraging contractors to come forward with their 
errors before it is too late. 
A third barrier is that there are competing project and program goals.  Both the 
goals of the project at hand and the goals of the overarching program are important and 
must be met.  To overcome this barrier there must be integration of program and project 
management, which requires some changes.  A matrix organizational structure prevents 
effective integration and management of the process.  As one survey respondent noted, 
the project team and the Board should meet together.   
A fourth major barrier is that there may be little organizational support for 
change, as it requires time, energy, and resources.  The award fee process can be 
effective, both in theory and in practice.  However, to gain support for change from the 
organization, it must be shown that increased performance from contractors results in 
greater efficiencies that will result in savings, and enhanced customer satisfaction.  
Savings and enhanced customer satisfaction are crucial in the current environment.  
Without them, the organization will not provide the necessary resources and 
accountability to gain effective and significant change.  
What actions might Southwest Division take to enhance its current award fee 
process? 
Periodic reviews of the award fee process are the single, objective solution 
discovered by the research. A commitment to effective change by management is also 
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important.  Lastly, consistency through a streamlined process and specific evaluation 
criteria are critical. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Several key areas for further research have emerged from this investigation. The 
need for further research stems directly from the survey of personnel.  A number of 
patterns and issues emerged from the data collected, and warrant further focus. 
The current climate in the Government contracting arena is to move toward the 
increased use of Performance Based Contracts (PBC).  The data collected suggests that 
there is a tendency to focus on inputs in the evaluation process, rather than on the outputs 
or outcomes.  The researcher concludes that part of the reason for complacency is that 
contractors are not held accountable.  The environmental CPAF contracts include routine 
services that might lend themselves well to PBC.  Further research could investigate and 
determine those tasks or elements that may be separated as PBC elements.  Once 
identified, further research could determine if those elements should or could remain on 
the CPAF contract and be fixed priced, or moved to a separate firm-fixed-price contract 
arrangement.  The feasibility for PBC and/or fixed price arrangement would need to be 
determined, along with identifying any possible increases or decreases in administrative 
burdens, and any loss of control over contract performance.    
Another area for further research is to investigate the use of non-monetary 
incentives.  Some non-monetary incentives include reduced oversight by the 
Government, increased positive performance evaluations, award-term contracting, 
publication of successful projects in appropriate trade journals, and command letters of 
appreciation to individual contractor employees. 
A final area suggested for research is to perform an analysis of the market and a 
survey of contractors to determine what motivates contractors, and why.  The purpose 
would be to define what motivates contractors in the environmental industry and seize 
opportunities for incentives from the data.  Then determine how an award fee plan could 
be structured to incorporate these incentives, which may mean multiple incentives on a 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY 
SOUTHWEST DIVISION SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. Does the current award fee process motivate contractors to performance 
excellence? 
2. Do final award fee board ratings reflect contractor performance? 
3. Are appropriate evaluation factors being used? 
4. Are all relevant factors utilized? 
5. If not, what factors are missing? 
6. Is the appropriate evaluation period length utilized? 
7. Does the government effectively communicate its objectives to 
contractors? 
8. Do objectives conflict with incentives? 
9. Do we verify that contractors are being incentivized? 
10. Does the current structure “make” contractors more dependent on 
government oversight? 
11. Can we use both short term and long-term incentives? 
12. What difficulties do you encounter in using the award fee process? 
13. How would you change the current process, if necessary? 
14. What barriers do you see if any, in implementing changes to the current 
procedures? 
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